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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1956
action. Once a rejected claim is established in the proper court, it then becomes
subject to the rules of estate administration. Following Rule of Pleading, Practice
and Procedure 1, 34A Wn.2d 68, the action (against the corporate defendant) was
properly commenced in Spokane County wherein the corporate executor "transacts
business."
Heirs and Next of Kin-Stepchildren. In the case of In re Smith's Estate, 149
Wash. Dec. 217, 299 P.2d 550 (1956) the supreme court affirmed the trial court's
decision that stepchildren cannot take as "issue"' or "children" under the Washington
statute of descent. The statute, RCW 11.04.020, provides in so far as here relevent:
"If the decedent leaves no husband or wife the estate goes in equal shares to his children,
and to the issue of any deceased child by right of representation" ... "the words 'issue,'
'child' and 'children' whenever used in this section shall be construed to include law-
fully adopted children." RCW 11.04.100 prohibits distinctions between kindred of the
whole blood and of the half blood who are entitled to inherit under the statutes of
descent and distribution. As between a stepchild and stepparent there is no blood
relationship, but only the relationship of affinity which is the relationship one spouse
has to blood relatives of the other spouse. Here there was no showing that the decedent
adopted plaintiffs and since there was no blood relationship between decedent and
plaintiffs, they cannot inherit as heirs at law.
Unsuccessful Bidders at Realty Sale-Right to Appeal. In re Scholes' Estate, 149
Wash. Dec. 319, 301 P2d 172 (1956) held that the unsuccessful bidder at a probate sale
was not an "interested party" entitled to appeal to the supreme court. Plaintiffs put in
a bid for the real estate, then withdrew it and entered a new bid. Before learning of
the new bid, the administratrix had accepted a bid which was for ten dollars less than
plaintiffs' final bid. Not knowing of plaintiffs' new bid, a return of sale on the lower
bid was made by the administratix. Plaintiffs appealed from an order confirming an
amended return of sale to the lower bidder. In affirming, the court first held that it
was within the discretion of the trial court to approve the lower price when the
difference was only ten dollars. As a second independent ground for the decision, the
court held that the appellant was not an "interested" party. In support of this the
court cited the case of Terry v. Clothier, 1 Wash. 475, 25 Pac. 673 (1890). The case
held that unsuccessful bidders are not interested parties and have no right to object to a
confirmation of sale. Under RCW 11.16.040 the plaintiffs were not interested parties
as their only concern was to purchase property from the estate. An "interested" party
is one such as a personal representative, who represents the estate, or an heir, legatee,
devisee or creditor who can claim a right to receive something from the estate. The
statute does not give the plaintiffs, situated as they are, the right to appeal.
REAL PROPERTY
Conveyance of After-Acquired Title by Quitclaim Deed; Effect
of Habendum Clause. The court, in Brenner v. Brenner Oyster Co.'
held the presence of an habendum clause in a quitclaim deed does not
show an intention to convey after-acquired title within the provisions
of RCW 64.04.070. In so holding, the court expressly overruled West
Seattle Land and Improvement Co. v. Novelty Mill Co., and Bradley
148 Wn.2d 264, 292 P2d 1052 (1956).
231 Wash. 435, 72 Pac. 69 (1903).
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v. Fackler?
The Brenner case involved two causes consolidated for trial and
appeal. The first cause was brought by the Oyster Co. against re-
spondents Brenner, Shugarts and Murphy for trespass upon the com-
pany's land. The second cause of action was brought by Annie Brenner
against the company to have title to the disputed land quieted in her
favor.
In 1902, Annie Brenner and her husband (now deceased) quit-
claimed certain second class tide lands to the Brenner Oyster Com-
pany. The original conveyance of the property to Mr. and Mrs.
Brenner contained an erroneous description, purporting to include land
above the ordinary high tide line. This description was incorporated
in the quitclaim deed at issue. In 1924 Annie Brenner acquired title
to the uplands described in her quitclaim deed of 1902. The Company,
in its trespass action, asserted that the habendum in the 1902 deed
expressed an intention to convey after-acquired title, and that title to
so much of Annie Brenner's 1924 purchase as had been described in
the 1902 deed should be quieted in its favor. The company relied on
the West Seattle Land Co. case and the Bradley case.
The court, construing RCW 64.04.050 and RCW 64.04.070 to-
gether,4 held that after-acquired title is conveyed (1) by warranty
deeds, and (2) by quitclaim deeds which express an intention to convey
after-acquired title, but not by quitclaim deeds without such express
intention. The court, in discussing the rule of the West Seattle Land
Co. case, stated,
This rule makes a distinction between the effect of quitclaim deeds
which have habendum clauses and those which do not. Such a distinction
is not sound. The addition of an habendum clause does not change the
effect of a quitclaim deed in any way. (italics supplied)
a 13 Wn.2d 614, 126 P2d 190 (1942).
4 RCW 64.04.050 Provides: "Quitclaim deeds may be in substance in the following
form: The grantor (here insert the name or names and place of residence), for and
in consideration of (here insert the consideration) conveys and quitclains to (here
insert grantee's name or names) all interest in the following described real estate
(here insert description), situated in the County of, State of Washington."
"Dated this - day of __ 19-"
"Every deed in substance in the above form, when executed is a good and sufficient
conveyance, release and quitclaim to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, in fee of all the
then existing legal and equitable rights of the grantor in the premises therein described,
but shall not extend ta the after acquired title unless words are added expressing such
intention." (Italics supplied)
RCW 64.04.070 provides: "If a person, without title to a tract of land, sells and
conveys it by deed, and thereafter acquires title thereto, the title so acquired shall
pass to and vest in the grantee in the deed, and to his heirs and assigns forever, and
shall thereafter run with such land.
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In the cases overruled, the court had held that an habendum added to
a quitclaim deed estopped the grantor from asserting after-acquired
title against his grantee. The rule of the West Seattle Land Co. case
and of the Bradley case' was based upon dicta in the Washington Ter-
ritory case of Ankeny v. Clark.6 Upon a consideration of the principles
of the West Seattle Land Co. case and of the pertinent statutes, it
seems clear that the court in the Brenner case arrived at the more
logical and valid construction of the law.
In the Ankeny case the question was whether or not the giving of a
quitclaim deed was sufficient performance of a contract to convey
land. In a statement of pure dicta, the court said that the operative
words of a quitclaim deed probably precluded the idea of its conveying
after-acquired title, but that a deed which purported on its face to
convey the real estate itself, as distinguished from only the grantor's
interest in that real estate, would operate to convey even after-acquired
title. The statement was based upon the judge's belief that the quit-
claim deed would be converted into a bargain and sale deed. Such a
result, assuming that it was accurate at the time the case was decided,
would be unlikely today because of the statutory distinctions between
a bargain and sale deed and a quitclaim deed.' Another factor indicat-
ing the weakness of the Ankeny decision lies in the court's statement
that in a quitclaim transaction in which the grantor purports to convey
the real estate it will be implied that the grantor intended to grant
after-acquired title. It is submitted that an expression of purpose,
however ineptly phrased, might reasonably be found to satisfy the
statutory requirement for passage of after-acquired title in a quit-
claim deed' where that expression relates to a grant of after-acquired
title. But a grant of real estate, as distinguished from only the grantor's
interest therein, appears to this writer to bear no relation to an
SThe Bradley case adopted the principle of the West Seattle La Co. case without
discussion, and the case will not be further discussed herein.
6 1 Wash. 549, 20 Pac. 583 (1889).
r Quit Claim Deed Statute--RCW 64.04.050, Note 4, supra.
Bargain and Sale Deed Statute-RCW 64.04.040 provides, inter alia: "Bargain and
sale deeds for the conveyance of land may be substantially in the following form, with-
out express covenants: The grantor (insert name and place of residence), for and
in consideration of (insert consideration) in hand paid, bargains, sells, and conveys
to (insert the grantee's name) the following described real estate (insert description)
situated in the County of _ State of Washington .... "
S . . ince the only statutory distinction between a bargain and sale deed and a
quitclaim deed depends upon the grantor's use of the words "conveys and quitclaims"
or "bargains, sells, and conveys," it would appear that a deed in which the words
"Conveys and quitclaims" were used would be difficult to construe as a bargain and
sale deed.
8 Note 4, Supra.
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expression of a grant of after-acquired title.
In 1903, the year in which the West Seattle Land Co. case was de-
cided, the statute setting out a suggested quitclaim deed was substan-
tially the same as RCW 64.04.040.' Yet in the West Seattle Land Co.
case the court said that a quitclaim deed with an habendum added con-
veys after-acquired title because it conveys the land itself (thus relying
on the Ankeny case), for it recites that the grantor quitclaims to the
grantee "to have and to hold all and singular the described premises,
together with the appurtenances unto said party of the second part and
to his heirs and assigns forever." This clause is an habendum nearly
identical to the one contained in the deed from Annie Brenner to the
Brenner Oyster Co.10
To give the habendum any effect modernly, and more particularly to
allow it to indicate an intention that after-acquired title shall pass to
the grantee in a quitclaim deed seems a questionable result. Modernly
habendum clauses are seldom used and even if present in a deed have
little utility.1
Research into the law of other jurisdictions finds no court bound to
the proposition set forth in the West Seattle Land Co. case. Texas
long ago had such a rule, but has since repudiated it."
The decision in the West Seattle Land Co. case can be explained as
a necessary result of the powerful equities in favor of the grantee.13
The court unfortunately gave the respondent a decision upon the basis
of an estoppel by deed. The result could have been reached in the case
by basing the decision upon the appellant's breach of an express agree-
ment (collateral to the deed) to acquire good title and to convey it
to the respondent.
The Brenner decision, in the light of the Washington statutes applic-
9Bal. Code, Sec. 4521. This section is identical to RCW 64.04.050 (note 4, supra)
with the exception of the wording used at the beginning of the paragraph defining the
interest passed when a quit claim deed is given. It provides, inter a .a: ". .. Every
deed in substance in form prescribed in the section, shall be deemed and held a good and
sufficient conveyance... "
10 "TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all and singular the premises, together with the
appurtenances, unto said parties of the second part and to his heirs and assigns forever."
Brief for Respondents, p. 12, Brenner v. Brenner Oyster Co. Note 4, Supra.
"In formal deeds the habendum clause is that part of the deed following the
premises which sets forth the estate to be held and enjoyed by the grantee. Words
of inheritance, however, may be, and now commonly are expressed in the premises.
Under statutes in most states (in Washington, see RCW 64.04.060) no words of
inheritance, either in the premises or habendum are necessary to pass a fee simple.
In modern conveyancing the habendum clause in deeds has degenerated into a mere
useless form . . . " 16 Am. Jur. Deeds, Sec. 53 (1936).
"Hunter v. Eastham, 95 Tex. 653, 6 S.W. (1902).
"3 The respondent, in relying on the appellant's quit claim deed, expended $50,000
in the construction of a flour mill upon the premises.
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able, and in relation to majority authority, appears as an unquestion-
ably sound result. Clearly it has changed the law in this area. Quit-
claim deeds can now be expected to convey after-acquired title only
when the grantor's intention is clearly expressed. This decision alters
contingent property rights of those holding interests in land under a
quitclaim deed with an habendum clause. However, that in itself is
little reason to challenge the Brenner decision, for the court's new in-
terpretation appears more adequately to reflect the true intentions of
the parties in the typical quitclaim transaction.
GIBERT J. PRicE, JR.
Right of owner of property abutting a highway to have the flow of traffic
continue past his property. In Walker v. State, 48 Wn2d 587, 295 P.2d 328 (1956),
the owner of a motel which abuts Washington primary highway No. 2 sought to
enjoin the State Highway Commission from installing a concrete center-line curb
until (1) the highway commission followed procedures set forth in RCW 47.52 (lim-
ited access facilities statute) and (2) until fair compensation be paid to him for the
diminution of his right of ingress and egress. The trial court sustained the state's
demurrer and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The court indicated that this was a problem of first impression in this jurisdiction
and stated: (1) that the plaintiff's allegations were insufficient to establish the high-
way as a limited access facility under the statute (RCW 47.52), (2) that the installa-
tion of the center-line curb involved no actionable impairment of ingress and egress,
(3) the owners of property abutting a highway have no property right in the continua-
tion or maintenance of the flow of traffic past their property, (4) the action of the
state was an exercise of police power in the maintenance of traffic control and that
damages resulting from an exercise of police power are non,compensable.
Right of riparian owner on non-navigable lake to use of the lake surface. In
Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wn.2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956), the plaintiffs, riparian owners
of a non-navigable lake, sued to enjoin the defendants, owners of a summer resort
on the lake, from renting rowboats and from certain other activities. The plaintiffs
alleged, inter alia, that the defendant's rowboats trespassed upon their exclusive owner-
ship of certain portions of the lake surface. The theory of the plaintiffs was that since
it had been decided in Snivel, v. State, 167 Wash. 385, 9 P.2d 773 (1932), that abutting
owners of a non-navigable lake own the lake bed, they should be entitled to exclusive
ownership of that portion of the lake surface located over the portion of the lake bed
which they own. Held; (1) With the respect to the boating, swimming, fishing and
other similar rights of riparian proprietors upon a non-navigable lake, these rights
or privileges are owned in common, and any proprietor or his licensee may use the
entire surface of the lake so long as he does not unreasonably interfere with the
exercise of similar rights by the other owners, and (2) although abutting owners on
a non-navigable lake own the bed of the lake, to determine the boundaries of each
riparian owner's ownership in the lake bed would probably require all riparian owners
to be joined in an action to have the lake bed apportioned.
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